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ABSTRACT
Three-Strikes Legislation and the Evolution of the Liberal Conception of Justice
By Lisa Dillon
The purpose of this paper is to examine the changing nature of the liberal conception of
justice using three-strikes legislation as a basis for comparison. It includes a brief
examination of the legal debate surrounding three-strikes legislation, as well as
comprehensive tables comparing the content of the laws in several states. The preponderance
of the paper explores the evolution of the liberal concept of justice in the works of John
Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. It concludes with a discussion of
contemporary liberal thought on justice, and more specifically, with an examination of the
work of John Rawls as it applies to three-strikes legislation.
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Introduction
Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of
their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made
the agents of injustice. –Henry David Thoreau

On April 16, 1963, a thirty-four year old African-American man sat in jail in
Birmingham, Alabama composing his thoughts on justice. Scribbling his manifesto on the
edge of a day-old newspaper, he finally arrived at one succinct declaration: “Injustice
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (King, 94). These words, written by Martin
Luther King, Jr. in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, offer but a small window into a
centuries-old debate concerning the fairness and equity of humankind. In fact, the virtues of a
just society were being considered by great Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle
hundreds of years before the time of Christ. Why, then, has the concept of justice intrigued
mankind for so long? Why has the notion of justice so confounded those who have attempted
to define it? Perhaps most importantly, why does the question, “What is justice?” continue to
inspire such passion in those who would answer? These important questions prove especially
profound in the United States, where “liberty and justice for all” has become the mantra of the
masses.
Because the subject of justice has proven so vast and complex, continuing to regard
the concept abstractly seems both impractical and without purpose. Instead, this paper seeks
to consider justice from the standpoint of a contemporary issue—three-strikes legislation.
Because the meaning of the word “justice” is in large part subjective, it is likely impossible to
develop an all-encompassing definition of the term. More specifically, it is not enough to
view justice in ethical, moral, or even legal terms. Rather, the spectrum of theoretical
arguments concerning justice drives at the heart of a much deeper debate regarding the

1

inherent rights of man, liberty, and human nature itself. Fortunately, however, the various
ways in which the concept of justice has been defined over time can be used to shed some
light on the reality of justice in the twenty-first century. While a variety of theoretical
formulations could be drawn upon for such an examination1, this paper uses a concentrated
approach in exploring the evolution of the concept of justice only from the point of view of
liberalism. Though one could argue the merits of such an approach based on liberalism’s
body of literature alone, perhaps the most obvious reason for focusing on liberal thought is the
United States’ liberal founding2. Thus, since the founding legal document of the United
States espouses a liberal viewpoint, it seems only fitting to examine the laws of its states
through the same lens.
In order to develop an appropriate foundation for analysis, the first chapter briefly
examines the history of three-strikes legislation. From its 1993 inception in Washington state
to its eventual spread into half of the American states, the issue of three-strikes is examined
from the perspectives of both its proponents and its critics. While its supporters argue that the
law reduces recidivism, its detractors adamantly insist that the law plays on societal fears
concerning race, sex, age, and class. Whether or not the legislation embodies such ulterior
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In fact, each ideology has its own major definer of justice. Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, for
example, deals heavily with the libertarian conception of justice. Karl Marx’s famous examination deals with
justice in terms of equality (classlessness), while anarchists like Emma Goldman argue that a truly justice society
cannot exist under the rule of government (See Love, Nancy. Dogmas and Dreams: A Reader in Modern
Political Ideologies. 1998. New York: Chatham House).
2
“Liberalism,” in the classical sense, could be defined as the belief that all men have an inherent right to life,
liberty, and property. Classical liberalism envisioned an extremely limited role for government in ensuring that
these rights were protected. Over time, however, the definitions of the terms “life, liberty, and property” became
much more broadly defined, and an expansive system of rights eventually came to rest under the umbrella of
liberalism. A “liberal” in the modern American sense, while still advocating the protection of life, liberty, and
property, places a much greater burden on government in ensuring that the needs of citizens are being met
(welfare state liberalism).
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motives, there seems to be no denying that lawmakers simply do not have the statistics to
support claims of success—a fact making the issue of justice all the more potent.
While Chapter One deals mostly with factual elements pertaining to the legislation
itself, Chapter Two focuses on setting up an analytical framework for the liberal conception of
justice. Using the works of John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, this chapter
first charts a changing liberal notion concerning the meaning of justice before using the
established framework to analyze three-strikes legislation. Overall, however, the chapter sets
the stage for a discussion of the theories of John Rawls, a contemporary philosopher whose
hallmark work deals exclusively with the concept of social justice. As such, the final chapter
outlines Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and the debate surrounding his work before concluding
with a discussion of the just or unjust nature of three-strikes legislation according to Rawls’
conception.
Though finding an answer to the question “What is justice?” is indeed much too great
a task for this examination, it is important to take note that any exploration of the concept
over time may bring us one step closer to determining what may, in the future, be conceived
of as either just or unjust. This work, therefore, will make a contribution in its attempt to keep
the yet unsettled debate alive. For it is when we stop questioning what is just that we must
truly fear for the vitality of our liberty.
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Chapter One: The Three strikes Controversy
From the time of its inception more than two centuries ago, the United States has been
idealized as the most free and just society in the world. The average American citizen has
little fear of unjust punishment, and there seems to be a general confidence among the people
in the ability of the law to oversee justice1. The early 1990’s, however, witnessed a change in
the tendency of our justice system to focus on rehabilitation2. Since that time, as a country,
we have largely moved toward viewing repeat criminal offenders as “lost causes” who should
be restricted from society indefinitely. This sweeping change in the laws of twenty-five
states, commonly known as “three strikes legislation,” has ignited a firestorm of controversy
and is responsible for rekindling a debate that inevitably arises repeatedly throughout history.
This debate, which concerns the true meaning of justice, naturally follows from actions like
those we have witnessed over the past decade. Before considering the just or unjust nature of
this legislation, however, it is first necessary to develop a solid understanding of the
legislation’s stated and tacit purposes and its outcomes. As such, this chapter focuses
specifically on the legal debate surrounding three strikes legislation.
While much of the controversy over three strikes laws has arisen in the years
following 1994, initiatives similar to that of three strikes have existed much longer.
Traditionally called “three time loser laws” or “persistent offender statutes” in states like New
1

During George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign, for example, he proclaimed, “America has never been
an empire. We may be the only great power in history that had the chance, and refused, preferring greatness to
power and justice to glory” (International Herald Tribune, 1999). Additionally, the 2006 edition of Sabato and
O’Connor’s American Government: Continuity and Change opens with this statement, “It is part of the
American creed that each generation should hand down to the next not only a better America, but an improved
economic, educational, and social status. In general, Americans have long been optimistic about our nation, its
institutions, and its future” (4).
2
See LaFree, Gary. 2002. “Too Much Democracy or Too Much Crime? Lessons from California’s ThreeStrikes Law.” Law and Social Inquiry 27(4): 875-903. ; Kovandzic, Tomislav, et al. 2004. “Striking Out As
Crime Reduction Policy: The Impact of Three Strikes Laws on Crime Rates in U.S. Cities.” Justice Quarterly
21(2): 207-245. Both discuss the change in U.S. focus from rehabilitation to punishment-oriented practices.
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York, Virginia, and Delaware, these measures were applied in only the most severe cases and
were often ignored altogether. In 1993, however, amid rising murder, rape, and burglary
rates, Washington state began applying the rule in order to send a message to its most heinous
criminal element. One year later, the idea was given both a full rebirth and its baseballesque
title in California (LaFree, 2002: 876; Kovandzic, et al, 2004: 209). Over the next three
years more than twenty other states followed suit, officially enacting the laws for the stated
purpose of reducing recidivism and as a means of discouraging first time offenders
(Kovandzic, et al, 2004: 208). Still, the multitude of laws passed in these states have focused
on a myriad of issues that seemingly accomplish ends outside of these goals—a factor
contributing to the exceedingly perplexing face of the three strikes rule.
Because the content of those measures has varied so greatly, determining what three
strikes legislation actually entails is a much more arduous task than might first be imagined.
While these laws have tended to focus on defining eligibility in terms of violent crimes, many
states have applied the rule in cases involving everything from firearms and drug violations to
embezzlement and burglary convictions. Additionally, five states, Arkansas, Georgia,
Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee, have “two-strikes” provisions, which enhance the
penalty for felony offenses after only two instances. The length of such penalties in both
second and third strike states varies as well. Whereas some states hand down sentences of
twenty-five years to life with the possibility of parole, others require mandatory life sentences
on the third offense, no matter what the felony involved; still others enforce a life term only if
the third offense is violent (Kovandzic, et al., 2004: 209-210). Thus, it is easy to see how
navigating the maze of these laws could become rather tricky.

5

One of the major problems with formulating a general description of three strikes laws
comes from these varying state definitions. State statutes involving habitual offenders range
from vague definitions of “serious crimes” to narrowly defined specifics and elaborate
combinations of felonies. The Louisiana and Virginia formulations, for instance, vary greatly
in their definitions of eligible crimes, especially where sexual offenses are concerned.
Whereas the Louisiana statute defines violent sexual crime in more than eight different ways,
the Virginia statute simply calls for the rule to apply in cases of “criminal sexual assault”
(Vitiello, 1997: 469, 478). As shown in Table 1 (at the conclusion of this chapter), only half
of three strikes states require that all three offenses be violent felonies in order to be sentenced
under the rule. As such, in states where judges are given no discretion (such as Virginia,
Washington, and Colorado) a defendant convicted of three non-violent felonies must be
sentenced to life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole varying in each state (Vitiello,
1997: 464, 477-478).
Texas is a notable exception to this rule, however. In this state, the first two strikes
against a convicted party may involve either violent or non-violent felonies. However, in
order for the law to be applied, the third strike or “triggering offense” must be violent in
nature. For example, a person could complete his or her sentence for murder and then commit
two additional non-violent felonies without being sentenced under the rule. However, if that
same individual commits the non-violent felonies prior to the murder, then the rule must be
applied (Vitiello, 1997: 477).
Perhaps no state has garnered more attention for its adoption of the rule than
California, where more than 90% of the nation’s three strikes convictions have occurred
(Lyons, 2004: 20). Enacting the rule only months after the infamous murder of a twelve-
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year-old resident named Polly Klaas, California has far surpassed other states in its use of the
law. More than 7,000 inmates have been sentenced under three strikes since 1995, with
nearly 60% of third offenses being non-violent (LaFree, 2002: 876; Freedberg, 2004: 7).
Moreover, California’s rule has been criticized as being the most unforgiving. As Louis
Freedberg writes, in California:
Unlike any other state the third strike can be any of 500 felonies, even socalled “wobblers,” which can be prosecuted as misdemeanors. Regardless of
whether the third strike is stealing a $199 VCR or a brutal rape, offenders
receive a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentence (2004: 7).
Reacting to criticism such as this, California District Attorney Grover D. Merritt writes,
“Three Strikers have earned their long sentences because they are the most thick-skulled and
predictably wicked of felons. They hurt people, they hurt communities, and they hurt our
economy” (2002: 285).
Regardless of these conflicting opinions, California’s ever-expanding “strike zone,”
has been the topic of much debate in academic circles over the past decade. Close analysis of
the statute reveals that, because of the specificity of the law, the state casts its “strike net”
over about two and half times more residents than Pennsylvania’s rule. Moreover, while
thousands have been convicted under the California provision, there have been fewer than ten
convictions in each of the eighteen three strikes states that followed California in adopting the
law in 1994 and 1995 (Caulkins, 2001: 228). Figures like these not only indicate that the
California justice system is more willing to apply the rule, but also hint at the possibility that
the law has become a “catch-all” for repeat offenders regardless of their status as violent or
non-violent criminals.
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In response to such charges, California lawmakers placed Proposition 66 on the ballot
in November 2004. If passed, the California penal code would have been amended to include
several changes in the three strikes provision. First, third strike offenses would be restricted
to those specifically involving violence. Second, sections of the statute defining sexual
crimes would be re-written in order to address the multitude of sexual offenders escaping
punishment under the law. Third, it would allow for the re-evaluation of previously tried
cases that might be sentenced differently under the new amendments (Lyons, 2004: 21). One
month before the election, it appeared that voters would give their discerning stamp of
approval to Proposition 66. When the results were in, however, the measure was defeated
53% to 47%. Political scholars and pundits alike have speculated that it was the combined
efforts of Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Fraternal Order of Police that
helped to quash the proposition. Citing the mandatory release of hundreds of criminals under
the new amendment, their opposition campaign successfully convinced voters that they would
be hurting the community by voting “yes” (Bailey, 2005: 6).
California’s statute has also been at the center of the larger legal and theoretical debate
over three strikes laws. Only two cases have managed to garner the consideration of the U.S.
Supreme Court, both cases deriving from incidents in California. These cases helped to
underscore the problems inherent to the three strikes measure and, for its detractors, have
served as quintessential examples of the misuse of the law. Taken into joint-consideration,
Lockyer v. Andrade and Ewing v. California were both decided in March of 2003.
Leandro Andrade has become a poster child of sorts for organizations like the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who point to the case as the quintessential example
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of the injustice that can arise from the three strikes measure3. In and out of prisons since
1982, Andrade had committed a number of crimes that qualified for “wobbler” status in
California, leading some to be declared misdemeanors while others were classified as
felonies. Finally, in November of 1995, Andrade entered a K-Mart store in Ontario,
California and proceeded to steal videotapes totaling $84.70. Then, two weeks later, he
revisited the same store and once again committed theft, this time totaling $68.84 in
videotapes. Upon arrest Andrade was charged with two felony counts of theft and was
subsequently sentenced to two twenty-five years to life terms when his previous felony
convictions were taken into account. A longtime heroin addict, Andrade had a history of
petty thefts which he committed in order to fund his drug habit. None of his convictions,
however, were violent in nature (Lockyer v. Andrade, 2003).
After a series of failed appeals, Andrade’s sentence was overturned in the Ninth
Circuit on the reasoning that the sentence was proportionally extreme. California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to uphold the sentence in
2002 with oral arguments being made by state attorney Douglas Danzig. The court upheld
Andrade’s sentence in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. In the
decision, Justice O’Connor concluded that the California Court of Appeals was initially
correct in upholding the sentence and additionally found that the Ninth Circuit “erred” in its
assessment that the sentence was “unreasonable” (Lockyer v. Andrade, 2003).
A dissenting opinion was drafted by Justice Souter with the support of Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer. This minority opinion held that the decision in Andrade’s
case was not only a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
3

See the ACLU’s defense of Andrade’s case at: http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/10306prs20021105.html
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punishment, but also argued that Andrade’s second and third offenses actually only
constituted one felony strike since the instances involved one victim and occurred during a
short period of time. Moreover, in the words of Justice Souter, “Andrade did not somehow
become twice as dangerous when he stole the second handful of videotapes; his
dangerousness may justify treating one minor felony as serious and warranting long
incapacitation, but a second such felony does not disclose greater danger warranting
substantially longer incapacitation” (Lockyer v. Andrade, 2003).
While Andrade’s case may, to some experts4, seem a cut-and-dry case of injustice,
Gary Ewing’s case proves much more complicated. Ewing was convicted of “grand theft in
excess of $400” in California after stealing three golf clubs from a sports shop in 2000.
Ewing’s record detailed a laundry list of convictions dating back to 1988, many involving
violence, drugs, and firearms. After being convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years to
life, Ewing filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeals, which was subsequently
denied. In a final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Ewing’s attorney asked the court to not
only consider that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but also claimed that Ewing’s
case should have special consideration as a “wobbler” (Ewing v. California, 2003).
In a decision very much resembling the Andrade case, “Justice O’Connor, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that Ewing’s sentence [was] not grossly
disproportionate and therefore [did] not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments” (Ewing v. California, 2003). Moreover, the fact “that grand theft
is a ‘wobbler’ under California law is of no moment. Though California courts have

4

Observers at the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, argue that the law acts as a “racial control
mechanism,” while studies conducted by the Justice Policy Institute (see footnote page 12) show that minorities
are indeed disproportionately sentenced under the rule.
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discretion to reduce a felony grand theft charge to a misdemeanor, it remains a felony for all
purposes.” The dissenting opinion was once again written by Justice Souter with Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer concurring. Very much echoing the sentiment expressed in the
Andrade case, Justice Souter concluded that Ewing’s sentence had been “grossly
disproportionate.” Nonetheless, as before, the decision of the appellate court to uphold the
sentence was sustained 5-4 (Ewing v. California, 2003).
Though Andrade and Ewing have become the public faces of third strike offenders, it
is nonetheless important to ask how well these men really represent their criminal
counterparts. Both men are racial minorities, (Latino and black, respectively) and both were
in their late thirties at the time of their third strike arrests. Importantly, these men are
strikingly similar to other three strikes prisoners in California. First, like ninety-five percent
of the state’s three strikes prisoners, they are male. Second, they help make up the eighty-one
percent of three- strikes convicts who are between the ages of twenty-one and forty. Third,
they are among the seventy percent of “third-strikers” who are either black or Latino. Finally,
much like Andrade and Ewing, over seventy-percent of third strike offenders are sentenced
based on a non-violent third offense (Vitiello, 1997: 428-434; Bailey, 2005: 6).
Based on these figures, it is easy to see why three strikes has been criticized as a mass
removal program for young, male minorities. However, discerning whether there is any merit
to these claims is an extremely difficult task, as three strikes prison population figures nearly
mirror those of the general prison population. As such, racial criticisms of the justice system
must necessarily be aimed at the entire justice system, not just the legislation—an arduous
task at best. Still, minorities are imprisoned under the law so disproportionately as to merit a
deeper understanding of the issues behind the question.
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A study conducted by the Justice Policy Institute5 found that African American
offenders are thirteen times more likely to receive life imprisonment upon their third strike
than white offenders, while Latinos are about one-and-one-half times more likely than whites
to receive life (JPI, 2004: 7). In Los Angeles alone, African Americans are about fourteen
times more likely to have their non-violent third strike offense classified as a felony than their
white counterparts (JPI, 2004: 17). Moreover, there is some evidence that three strikes is
being disproportionately applied in areas where the black population is most concentrated. As
the study of California contends,
Los Angeles County confines six times as many people per 100,000 as San
Francisco County. Thus, the Three Strikes law did not deliver the simple
uniformity that initial promoters promised. Rather, the power to determine
sentences shifted from the judge in the context of a sentencing decision to the
prosecutor in the context of charging decisions or plea negotiations. Those
decisions have been applied at dramatically different rates throughout the state
(JPI, 2004: 19).
Regardless of whether or not white San Franciscans are receiving more lenient treatment, the
fact remains that, in terms of statistics, whites are far from being proportionately represented
in either the general prison population or among third-strikers.
A study conducted by the State of Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, a
state-funded research body, found similar results in that state. Accordingly, a report requested
by and prepared for the governor suggests that
People of color are over-represented at every stage of Washington’s criminal
justice system, from arrest through sentencing and incarceration. In 2002,
African Americans made up 21.3% of the state prison population, but just 3%
5

The Justice Policy Institute (JPI) is a non-profit organization (think tank) that works to reduce the need for
incarceration through youth and adult outreach programs. It has commissioned several studies of the ThreeStrikes program and other programs of its kind to determine whether or not lengthened incarcerations are
effective in reducing crime rates. Though its mission statement does not necessarily hint at either a liberal or
conservative bent, it works in concert with a myriad of liberal organizations including the NAACP in opposing
policies that are often favored by conservatives (such as three-strikes).
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of the state’s adult population. Hispanics accounted for 11% of the prison
population, but just 7% of the state population (SGC, 2003: 3).
Moreover, Washington’s Native American population was also found to be disproportionately
sentenced under the rule. As in California, however, whites are excessively underrepresented
in Washington’s prison system (SGC, 2003: 4).
Having outlined many of the problems with three strikes legislation in practice, it is
important to examine whether or not the measure is meeting its suggested aims. That is, has
three strikes reduced crime? Is the law producing a deterrent effect?
According to a study conducted by crime researchers at the University of Alabama at
Birmingham, there is “no credible statistical evidence that passage of three strikes laws
reduces crime by deterring potential criminals or incapacitating repeat offenders” in any state
that has enacted the law (Kovandzic, et Al, 2004: 234). The findings of the study suggest
that, even if criminals had a strong fear of being caught, there are no substantive data to show
that they are informed enough about the law for it to have the effect of deterrence.
Additionally, the authors argue that, in order for three strikes to be effective, it must target
criminals in their youth. Thus, the task of discerning which juvenile offenders are “high-risk”
can be nearly impossible. Finally, they argue that a high percentage of third strike offenders
are addicted to either drugs or alcohol. As such, the kind of reasoning skills necessary to
produce a deterrent effect may be temporarily retarded by addiction in these cases
(Kovandzic, et al, 2004: 235-236).
Criminologist Jonathan Caulkins agrees that three strikes is not producing its desired
aim. Using a mathematical cost-benefit model, Caulkins determined that states employing the
measure would benefit much more by increasing sentences for first time offenders and by
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capping second and third offense sentences between six and ten years for non-violent
offenses. Moreover, the author not only finds that the law is not effective at reducing crime,
but also concludes that the law is extremely costly to taxpayers who will be faced with
funding a growing prison population that will never “age-out” (Caulkins, 2001: 244-245).
Observers with the Harvard Law Review suggest that states like California are
approaching crime reduction from the wrong angle. Instead of focusing on punishing citizens,
they suggest that states should “confront the twin problems of poverty and racism that make
individuals more likely to commit crime” (Harvard Law Review, 1994: 2126). As such,
rather than sinking exorbitant amounts of money into prison systems, states should focus on
improving the lives of citizens by providing greater access to education and healthcare in the
most affected communities. Additionally, long term goals should include “eliminating
discrimination in the workplace and increasing legitimate employment opportunities for
young men of color” (Harvard Law Review, 1994: 2127). Conversely, the current three
strikes solution merely “maintains the boundaries of economic and racial segregation” and
funds the continued punishment of those who have lived their entire lives in dire situations
(Harvard Law Review, 1994: 2128).
The issue of three strikes, as discussed above, has been considered from a pragmatic,
factual standpoint. The law has twice been ruled Constitutional, and it is unlikely that this
will change in the near future. However, while we are often tempted to view law, morality,
and justice as interchangeable in definition, in reality they often prove strange bedfellows.
The question of the meaning of justice has itself been debated for thousands of years and
holds as much salience now as in the world’s first societies. Thus, in the United States where
liberty is purported to be held in the highest regard, it seems a strange irony to be debating the
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limits of cruel and unusual punishment. Ultimately, the problem of the just or unjust nature of
three strikes sentencing merely scratches the surface of a much larger, much more infinite
question. What, then, is justice? Why has the concept so intrigued mankind for so long, and
why has the notion of justice so confounded those who have attempted to define it?
Justice, as we generally conceive of the term today, has traditionally been defined
using an ever-evolving liberal conception. As early as the seventeenth century, the liberal
notion of a just society was already taking shape. Since that time, justice has been defined
and redefined continually under an expanding umbrella of liberal thought. Chapter two
attempts to chart a brief history of the changing liberal ideal as it relates to justice, in hopes of
creating a better understanding of the point at which we having currently arrived.
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Table 1
States with Three-Strikes Provisions**

State

State
Year
Previous Convictions
Code/Statute Enacted
(Felonies)

Third Strike
Conviction

Mandatory Sentence

Parole Option
No

Arkansas

§5-4-501

1995

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

California

§667

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

25 Years to Life

Colorado

§16-13-101

1994

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

Connecticut

§53a-40

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Delaware

Title 11 §4214

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Florida

§775.084

1995

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Dependent on severity of 3rd
conviction

Yes

Georgia

§17-10-7

1995

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Illinois

Chapter 20
§5/33B-1

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Indiana

§35-50-2-8.5

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Louisiana

§15:529.1

1995

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Maryland

Article 27
§643B

1994

Violent

Violent

25 Years Minimum

Yes
(Must be age 65,
served 15 years)

Montana

§46-18-219

1997

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Nevada

§207.010

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

25 Years Minimum

Yes
(After 10 years)
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Yes
(Dependent on
third offense)
Yes
(After 40 years)

Table 1 (Continued)
States with Three Strikes Provisions

State

State
Code/Statute

Year
Enacted

Previous
Convictions
(Felonies)

Third Strike
Conviction

Mandatory
Sentence

Parole Option

New Jersey

§2C:43-7.1

1995

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

New Mexico

§31-18-23

1994

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment plus
time for 3rd conviction

North Carolina

§14-7.7

1994

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Pennsylvania

§97114

1995

Violent

Violent

25 Years to Life
Imprisonment

No

South Carolina

§17-25-45

1996

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

Yes
(Under special
circumstances)

Tennessee

§40-35-120

1994

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

No

Texas

§12.42

1996

Violent or Non-violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

Undefined in statute

Vermont

Title 13 §11

1995

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

Undefined in statute

Yes
(Must be age 70 and
served 35 years)
Yes
(After 30 years of life
term)

Virginia

§19.2-297.1

1994

Violent

Violent

Life Imprisonment

Yes
(Under special
circumstances)

Washington

§9.94A.392

1993

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

West Virginia

§61-11-18

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

Yes
(Exceptions—
murder, first degree
sexual assault)

Wisconsin

§939.62

1994

Violent or Non-violent

Violent or Non-violent

Life Imprisonment

No

**Information on three-strikes statutes was obtained at each states’ legislative website
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Chapter Two: Charting the Growth of the Liberal View of Justice
Literally taking a page from John Locke’s Two Treatises of Civil Government,
Thomas Jefferson declared in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It was with these words that the American
conception of a just nation was born, and as that nation grew, so too did the scope of citizens’
rights and their expectations of just treatment. While Jefferson and his classical liberal
predecessors saw only a limited role for government in the lives of citizens, over time, the
protection of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” came to include the development of
an expansive welfare state and the “unalienable” right to housing, food, and basic healthcare.
Yet, in some sense, if only nostalgically, America still clings tightly to the liberal principles
espoused in our founding documents. Consequently, it seems both logical and necessary to
examine how our current conception of justice compares with those espoused during our
liberal founding. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to locate the origin of the liberal
conception and to begin charting its evolutionary path toward an expanded definition of
justice.
Locating the Origin with the “Father”
Determining a point of origin in the long history of liberal thought is indeed a
monumental, if not impossible, task. In fact, while we can sometimes be assured that much
of a particular thinker’s ideas have been heavily influenced by the works of another great
mind1, we must be careful in assuming that we are correct in placing the birthplace of these

1

John Locke, for instance, is thought to have built heavily on Thomas Aquinas’s idea of “natural law” in his
Second Treatise on Civil Government. Subsequently, Lockean ideals were used in drafting both the Declaration
of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.
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ideas with this predecessor, as he must also have been inspired by those who came before
him. Consequently, deciding which liberal thinkers represent true benchmarks in the
progression of liberal thought appears to require somewhat of an arbitrary selection process.
Fortunately, however, this problem should not affect one’s ability to make a careful selection
of thinkers whose thoughts are most representative of (though not the most original among)
the whole. Following this line of thought, then, it seems logical that any discussion of
liberalism should begin with John Locke, the “father of liberalism.” While Locke’s ideas do
not necessarily represent the absolute origin of the liberal conception, his writings represent
the point at which liberal ideas became politically and socially salient2. As such, for the
purposes of examining justice in historical perspective, Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil
Government is a more than satisfactory starting point.
Justice According to the Law of Nature
Any attempt to successfully examine the Lockean view of social, moral, and legal
justice, must first consider how Locke envisioned man in his original or “natural” state. That
is, most of Locke’s ideas about justice in society arise from his views on governmental or
political power. The origins of political power, according to Locke, can only properly be
conceived of in the “state of nature.” Thus, in order to understand political power and
subsequently justice, we must first understand this state of nature (Locke, 25). Moreover,
while many of Locke’s contemporaries conceived of the origin of man as fundamentally evil3,
Locke’s state of nature is representative of the enduring liberal notion of man as principally
virtuous. This aspect of liberalism, that man has a fundamental inclination toward virtue
2

See pages one and two of Love, Nancy. Dogmas and Dreams: A Reader in Modern Political Ideologies.
1998. New York: Chatham House.
3
Thomas Hobbes, for example, argued that a single, strong ruler (“Leviathan”) would be necessary in order to
protect the weak from the strong.
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rather than vice, proves important to generations of liberal thinkers when it comes to
conceptualizing what justice truly entails.
In Locke’s conception of the state of nature, all men are in “a state of perfect freedom
to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other
man” (Locke, 25). As theorist Steven Forde explains, Locke never outwardly expresses what
this “law of Nature” specifically entails, “though many individual principles are said by him
to belong to the natural law” (Forde, 2001: 397). Among these principles exists Locke’s
most fundamental assertion that natural law calls for the “peace and preservation of all
mankind,” accomplished when human beings respect the rights of others and refrain from
injuring themselves and their fellow man (Locke, 26). Thus, as this condition would seem to
imply, Locke’s law of nature is a normative rather than a practical code of behavior,
suggesting how the affairs of men should be ordered (Forde, 2001: 398). Locke’s own
explanation of this principle of preservation alludes to its somewhat utopian quality:
Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station
willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in
competition, ought as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not
unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what
tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another (Locke, 26).
The use of the phrase “ought to” in Locke’s analysis seems an inherent admission that the
actual actions of man will not always, in practice, be ordered according to the law of nature.
As such, of necessity, Locke must also provide a theoretical method of dealing with those
who continually choose to subvert the law of nature and the closely related “law of reason,”
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which holds that all individuals should be treated equitably (Locke, 30). Before taking up
this issue, however, a brief explanation of Locke’s view on property is warranted.
In order for man to transgress the law of nature, he must in some way steal or
otherwise harm the property of another man. While the definition of “property” in the
contemporary sense knows little boundaries, for Locke, there exist only two ways of
possessing property. The first type of property is inherent to each person. That is, all men
have property in their own lives, which is absolute and can never, within the law of nature, be
obtained by others4. Second, Locke believes that all men hold the bounty of the earth in
common, with each man being entitled to no more and no less than his neighbor. Therefore,
the only way for a man to possess a piece of the earth, whether it be an apple, a cow, or a tract
of land, is through the mixing of his labor with the object he desires to possess. As Locke
asserts,
The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his hands, we may say are
properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him
removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it excludes the common
right of other men. For this “labour” being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others (Locke, 30).
The assertion that there must be “enough and as good” remaining for others
anticipates the problem of the accumulation of large amounts of wealth into the hands of the
few. Addressing this problem at length, Locke claims that “as much as any one can make use
of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in.

4

In chapter four of the Second Treatise, for example, Locke describes the state of being subject to the will or
authority of another as “slavery” (29-30).
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Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others5” (Locke, 31). As
interpreted by Forde, “This restriction is rooted in the general good of mankind, inasmuch as
waste robs others of their share” (2001: 401). Those who labor to consume without wasting,
then, have acted properly and within the bounds of nature6. Consequently, “He that had as
good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain, ought not to
meddle with what was already improved by another’s labour; if he did it is plain he desired
the benefit of another’s labour” (Locke, 32).
Just Punishment within the State of Nature
Having explored Locke’s explanation of the acquisition of property, an examination
of the state of war (essentially an account of justice and injustice within the state of nature)
can now be undertaken. Just as Locke’s rules for acquiring property are clearly delineated, so
too are his conditions for crime and punishment in the state of nature. His definition focuses
heavily on both threat and action:
The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and therefore declaring
by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but sedate, settled design upon
another man’s life puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has
declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to
be taken away by him, for anyone that joins with him in his defence, and
espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just I should have a right to
destroy that which threatens me with destruction; for by the fundamental law
of Nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be
preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred, and one may destroy a
man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for
the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion because they are not under the
ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule but that of force and
violence, and so may be treated as a beast of prey, those dangerous and

5

John C. Winfrey refers to this as a “satisficing” model of wealth, which Locke views as being the only type of
wealth ordained by God (1981: 435). “Charity Versus Justice in Locke’s Theory of Property.” 1981. Journal
of the History of Ideas 42(3): 423-438.
6
As will be discussed later and in more detail, these restrictions on property are no longer an issue, according to
Locke, after the advent of money.
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noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their
power (Locke, 28).
As shown, then, Locke maintains that those who go against the laws of nature and reason
automatically forfeit their rights to their own lives and place themselves in a state of war with
their victims. Just as an animal of prey cannot be trusted, neither can a member of a
community who threatens the very existence of the other members.
Locke’s definition of just punishment goes further, however. While modern-day
codes of law stress varying degrees of punishment for varying degrees of offense, the state of
nature as conceived by Locke permits but one punishment for all transgressions, no matter
how slight or heinous their nature. That is, the infringement of one man on the rights or
property of another man should be taken just as seriously as an attempt on that man’s life.
Thus, by stealing the fruits of another’s labor, a man places himself in a state of war with his
victim. As Locke contends,
He that in the state of Nature would take away the freedom that belongs to
anyone in that state must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take
away everything else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he
that in the state of society would take away the freedom belonging to those of
that society or commonwealth must be supposed to design to take away from
them everything else, and so be looked on as in a state of war (Locke, 29).
By trespassing upon the liberty or property of another, the aggressor has indicated to society
that his greed, contempt, and disregard for the law of reason and nature know no bounds.
Accordingly, Locke argues that such a man should be punished in the gravest of ways:
This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him,
nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so
to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from
him; because using force, where he has no right to get me into his power, let
his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose that he who would
take away my liberty would not, when he had me in his power, take away
everything else (Locke, 29).
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In carrying out this punishment, however, “the state of war ceases” and society is restored to
its prewar state (Locke, 29).
Locke does not relegate the beginnings of mankind entirely to the realm of the
theoretical and ahistorical. After all, Locke’s own intentions for his Second Treatise included
exposing the dangers of the tyrannical monarchies of seventeenth century England. In fact,
Locke’s explanation of the state of nature mostly serves to provide a setting for the creation
of the first “social contract” and subsequently the first form of governmental authority. Why,
then, does man leave the state of nature in favor of society and government?
The Social Contract and Just Punishment in a State of Government
Though man has, in the state of nature, a perfect freedom to live and labor as he
chooses, according to Locke, man also fears the looming possibility that he may be robbed of
his property. The fear of losing the totality of his freedom, therefore, drives man to enter into
society—to join with others who have fears not unlike his own. This union of men, otherwise
known as a “social contract,” gives rise to government. This new government’s charge is
restricted to protecting life, liberty, and the fruits of man’s labor—collectively termed
“property” by Locke (53).
Moreover, government as it now exists satisfies three separate problems previously
left unchecked in the state of nature. First, the rights and wrongs of society will now be
codified into law. Second, society will witness the creation of an impartial judge who will be
responsible for discerning where transgressions against the law have and have not occurred.
Finally, an unbiased authority will oversee and administer punishments to those who have
been sentenced by the judge. Since the aforementioned conditions can never be met within
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the state of nature, Locke believes that man’s time in this original state is ephemeral at best
(54).
In maximizing the preservation of property, man inherently sacrifices many of the
rights previously afforded him in the sate of nature. Specifically, the social contract comes to
restrict the freedom of man in two important ways. First, man no longer has an unlimited
power to act in his own best interest or for the preservation of his fellow man. Rather, man
must now act within the boundaries of the law. Second, where he once acted as victim,
judge, and executioner, man is now prohibited from punishing aggressors and is bound to
abide by the decisions of legal authorities. Consequently, not only does man lose a measure
of liberty, but also of equality, as he must now submit to the law-making and decisionmaking powers of others. This social pact does not, however, require a complete abdication
of power. As Locke clarifies:
And so, whosoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated
and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by upright and
indifferent judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to
employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such
laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the
community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other
end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people (Locke, 54).
Man, therefore, makes the difficult decision to exit the state of nature in order that a
government might oversee the realm of justice and provide for a more evenhanded method of
administering punishment than was previously available.
From Lockean Liberty to Benthamite Utility
Moving forward from John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, it seems a
logical progression to turn attention toward the theories of Jeremy Bentham. Writing more
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than a half-century after Locke’s death, Bentham, like his predecessor, was also uniquely
interested in criticizing British society. While Locke’s writings are a reaction to the rigid
hierarchy of the English monarchy, Bentham’s work reflects his personal contempt for Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, a work which had achieved
legendary status in England when Bentham was still just a child. Two of Bentham’s most
famous works, A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, critique Blackstone’s volume while also expanding upon Locke’s writings.
Though it may be, as economist Jacob Viner once argued, that “Bentham was perhaps the
least original in his stock of general ideas, but clearly the most original in finding means and
devices for putting his philosophy to practical use,” his essays nonetheless deeply question
the reality behind the state of nature, and his detailed explication of government and
punishment remains unique among theorists in the liberal tradition (1949: 360).
Bentham’s work represents a logical next step in the progression of the liberal
conception for several reasons. First, unlike Locke, Bentham views the subject of just
punishment as one of complexity. Consequently, his theory provides a stepping stone from
Locke’s broader view of acceptable sanctions to a more narrowed account based on
individual circumstances. Second, Bentham distinguishes himself from other liberals by
combining liberalism’s focus on liberty with the idea of societal utility. Finally, the vital
theory of John Stuart Mill, who will be discussed later, found its roots in Benthamite
utilitarianism and is in part a reformulation and an expansion of Bentham’s conception.
Bentham, the State of Nature, and Justice in the Practical Realm
Much as Locke began his inquiry into civil government with a discussion of the
origins of society, Bentham’s A Fragment on Government also explores government’s
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primary foundations. The phrase “state of nature,” according to Bentham, proves rather
difficult to define because of the varying ways in which writers use the term “society.” In
some instances, argues Bentham, society exists within the state of nature. In others, society is
only formed in concert with the rise of government. Bentham, seeking to rescue “society”
from such vague definitions, redefines the term to include two specific interpretations. The
phrase “natural society” is subsequently used to describe society before government, while
“political society” refers to post-government societies (Bentham, 56-57). The supposed
difference between the two is what Bentham terms “a habit of obedience”—implying that, in
the state of nature, obedience is not required of man, while obedience is essential to society
once the formation of government has been witnessed. In Bentham’s view, however, this
logic is fallacious, as obedience in either case is neither wholly present nor wholly absent.
For example, in political society, most men will be forced to obey at one point in time. Those
same men, however, will also sometimes command the obedience of others, allowing them
the freedom to order their own actions vis-à-vis their subordinates—a partial state of nature.
Following this logic, Bentham deduces that the state of nature is not necessarily limited to a
pre-government existence, but may instead exist simultaneously with government. As a
result, the only true way of defining society in terms of obedience is via continuum. That is,
man approaches political society as obedience increases and moves further toward natural
society as obedience decreases (Bentham, 58-59).
Though Bentham’s proposed clarification of the state of nature may, in some ways,
seem hyper-specific and inconsequential, the definition ultimately suits his purpose of
designing a proper role for government. By removing the actions of man from the realm of
the theoretical, Bentham gains the advantage of forcing the abstract to serve a practical
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purpose. More precisely, whereas a just society had previously only been conceptually
attainable, Bentham brings portions of the theoretical into the actual and is subsequently able
to frame government (where it is willing) as a capable arbiter of just laws and just
punishments. Accordingly, this reformulation of the state of nature served the social reformer
in Bentham quite well (Viner, 1949: 362).
Justice as Utility
Bentham’s most famous pursuit of government that is both practical and just can be
found within the pages of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this
essay, perhaps his most famous work, Bentham argues that man is at the mercy of his “two
sovereign masters”—the competing forces of pleasure and pain. These contradictory powers
underscore the importance of recognizing the “principle of utility.” Bentham explains:
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case
comes to the same thing), or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent
the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose
interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the
happiness of the community: if a particular individual then the happiness of
that individual (86).
Since man is beholden to the forces of both pleasure and pain, Bentham believes that man is
happiest when the interests of the community are maximized. The interests of the
community, being the sum total of the interests of the “several members who compose it”
cannot be met, however, without first fulfilling the interests of individuals. Therefore, the
utility of individuals and subsequently of the community is maximized when the sum of
individuals’ pleasure is increased, or the total of man’s pain is decreased (86). Bentham
clarifies the relation of the principle to government:
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A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed
by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated
by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to
augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to
diminish it (87).
The law, then, should be based around this principle of utility. Moreover, “right” and
“wrong” would thus be the perceived outcomes of either the maximized or diminished utility
of the community, respectively (Bentham, 89).
Since a maximized level of community utility is the ultimate goal of government, it
follows that legislators would be charged with ensuring an optimal level of “pleasure and
security” within the community (Bentham, 90). Before such protection can be assured,
however, Bentham argues that it is important for legislators to come to understand the various
sources of both pleasure and pain. The first of these sources, the physical sanction7, flows
from the “ordinary course of nature” and is therefore outside the purposeful control of man.
The political sanction, conversely, results from the actions of a community’s authorities or
ruling powers. That is, in this instance, pleasure or pain results from the actions or decisions
of government. A third type, the moral sanction, arises from the “dispositions of particular
men” rather than any particular law or government action. The religious sanction, lastly,
issues from “an invisible superior being,” or in other words, from God (94). An informed
government will be capable of using these sources of pleasure and pain for both reward and
punishment. Moreover, when government gains a greater understanding of pleasure, it is
more adept in ensuring that its punishments are proportional to the level of the general
disturbance of the individual or community happiness (106).

7

Bentham uses the term “sanction” to denote that either pleasure or pain can result from this source.
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Motive, Disposition, and Just Punishment as Maximized Utility
Although knowing the sources of pleasure and pain can make government more just
with regard to punishment, difficulties in determining the depth of disturbance in community
happiness persist. On this point, Bentham answers:
In every transaction, therefore, which is examined with a view to punishment,
there are four articles to be considered. 1. The act itself, which is done. 2.
The circumstances in which it is done. 3. The intentionality that may have
accompanied it. 4. The consciousness, unconsciousness, or false
consciousness, that may have accompanied it.
Seeing that these conditions may be combined, Bentham argues that the just or unjust nature
of a punishment can be decided based on two narrow factors. The first is motive. The second
is disposition (Bentham 107).
A motive, being “anything that can give birth to an action,” always involves the
fulfillment of either pleasure or pain (or both). No single motive, however, is ever
intrinsically good or evil. Rather, as Bentham contends, a particular motive can only be
deemed good or evil insomuch as it is seen to either add to or take away from pleasure or
cause pain. Thus, when individuals refer to an “evil motive,” they are not speaking of the
quality of the motive itself, but of the effects of the motive (Bentham, 110). Defending one’s
honor, for example, could be identified as a motive for murder. Honor as a motive, however,
is not inherently good or evil. Rather, it is the effect of the motive (murder or pain) that
produces a qualitative outcome (111). As a consequence, in punishing an individual,
governments must not only take into account motives, but the outcomes of those motives.
While a man’s motives cannot be defined as either good or bad, Bentham asserts that
a man’s disposition can be so labeled (113). Disposition, Bentham admits, is abstract in
concept, yet important in determining the intended outcomes of a man’s motives. He posits:
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A man’s disposition may accordingly be considered in two points of view:
according to the influence it has, either, 1. On his own happiness: or, 2. On
the happiness of others. Viewed in both these lights together, or in either of
them indiscriminately, it may be termed, on the one hand, good; on the other,
bad; or, in flagrant cases, depraved (Bentham, 113).
In more succinct terms, then, disposition can be thought of as “the sum of a man’s intentions”
(Bentham, 114).
The subject of disposition is made still more complicated when one considers how a
man’s true disposition might be determined. From Bentham’s point of view, however, there
are several methods of deciphering an individual’s intentions, the first of which involves
comparing the level of temptation influencing the individual to the “degree of mischief” or
seriousness of the crime he or she is willing to commit. As he explains:
It would show a more depraved disposition, to murder a man for a reward of a
guinea, or falsely to charge him with a robbery for the same reward, than to
obtain the same sum from him by simple theft: the trouble he would have to
take, and the risk he would have to run, being supposed to stand on the same
footing in the one case as in the other (Bentham, 116).
Secondly, a man’s depravity level is said to increase when his level of mischief bears an
inverse relationship to his level of temptation. That is, a man is seen to be more depraved
when he commits a greater crime in the presence of less temptation. For example:
It shows a more depraved and dangerous disposition, if a man kill another out
of mere sport, as the Emperor of Morocco, Muley Mahomet, is said to have
done in great numbers; than out of revenge, as Sulla and Marius did in
thousands; or in the view of self-preservation, as Augustus killed many; or
even for lucre, as the same Emperor is said to have killed some (Bentham,
116).
Conversely, it also follows that the level of a man’s depravity becomes increasingly difficult
to discern when his level of temptation rises. Without regard to the level of temptation,
however, the “degree of deliberation” must be considered. Therefore, where the level of
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mischief is high (meaning that the crime committed is serious in nature), the level of
depravity will be considered excessive if the man is shown to have used forethought in
committing the act. From Bentham’s viewpoint, “It thus shows a worse disposition, where a
man lays a deliberate plan for beating his antagonist, and beats him accordingly, than if he
were to beat him upon the spot, in consequence of a sudden quarrel” (117).
As the above seems to suggest, from Bentham’s perspective, the “general object” of
government is to “exclude mischief” (120). The exclusion of mischief, however, requires the
institution of punishment, which Bentham believes can only be carried out under certain
circumstances. Primarily, he argues that punishment is without merit where a law “prevents
no mischief,” or in other words, where an act prohibited by law does not harm the
community. Moreover, punishments that have proven ineffective in preventing future
mischief or that have costs exceeding the expense of the mischief itself are, for Bentham,
unjustifiable. Finally, he asserts that the government should never hand down a punishment
for an act that would likely cease on its own, without reprimand (Bentham, 121).
Of course governments will eventually be forced to punish those who choose to
engage in criminal activity. Recognizing this, Bentham devises a set of rules that will ensure
that a given punishment is proportional to its related offense. The punishment, in other terms,
should be made to fit the crime. As such, Bentham supposes that adherence to three central
tenets will suffice. First, the chosen sentence must be substantial enough to conceivably
outweigh the reward obtained by committing the offense. Second, the greater the reward of
the offense, the more reasonable it is to expend greater resources on the punishment. Finally,
when a man is set to commit one of two offenses, no matter the costs, the consequences of
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committing the greater offense must be set high enough to that he is compelled to choose the
lesser crime (Bentham, 122-123).
One final aspect of Bentham’s theory of just punishment has yet to be delineated.
Though Bentham places much less emphasis on the classification of offenses, he nonetheless
considers such classes important in the determination of both disposition and punishment.
Comprising five different categories, Bentham’s “mischief’ classification scheme emphasizes
a methodology that is designed to test the effect of a crime on overall utility. “Offenses
against individuals” (private offenses) are thus contrasted with “offenses against
neighborhoods” (offenses affecting small groups). Likewise, self-regarding or “intransitive
offenses,” which occur when an offender harms only himself, are considered less heinous
than public offenses that affect the community at large. Finally, “offenses by falsehood” and
“offenses against truth” may fall into any one of these categories, and as such, vary in
seriousness (Bentham, 127-128).
The complexity of Bentham’s theory illuminates the importance of two necessary
observations. First, when it comes to punishment, there is much to be considered.
Specifically, making certain that a punishment is not either too lenient or too harsh in relation
to the crime committed requires contemplation of a vast array of factors. Second, Bentham’s
formulation of government requires the existence of both officials and citizens who possess
the knowledge of their options and a desire to maximize them. As such, it may properly be
suggested that Bentham’s attempts to bring the theoretical into the realm of the actual, in this
way, faces some difficulty in doing so.
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John Stuart Mill’s Reformulation
Much like Bentham, John Stuart Mill also subscribed to a utilitarian view of liberty
and justice. In fact, Mill was first exposed to the utilitarian philosophy at age two by
Bentham himself, who had befriended Mill’s father, James. Though James Mill had hoped
that his son would be the greatest among Benthamite philosophers, John Stuart Mill actually
came to see some of the tenets of Benthamism as unsound, and he therefore reworked
utilitarianism to his own liking (Warnock, 1962: 1-9). Particularly, Mill was more willing to
extend his definition of justice into the realm of personal liberty, circumventing the inevitable
effects of societal pressure on the individual. As such, Mill’s work signals yet another
benchmark in the evolution of the liberal conception of justice. Moreover, though Mill
indicates in his Essay on Bentham that he has a great deal of respect and admiration for his
predecessor, he also hints at a belief that Bentham focuses too much on jurisprudence and too
little on the individual and morality. Mill’s essays, consequently, deal almost exclusively
with these topics, leaving what he calls the “political” realm (the dominion of law) mostly
aside.
The Injustice of Social Tyranny
In the introduction to On Liberty, Mill argues that “the struggle between Liberty and
Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest
familiar” (126). The earliest days of man, claims Mill, were marked by man’s struggle
against the political tyranny of single rulers. Once men became actors in democratic
governments, however, a new problem presented itself. Though it had not been previously
recognizable, Mill says that a “tyranny of the majority” accompanied representative
government. He argues,
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The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most
numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who
succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people,
consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are
as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The
limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none
of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the
community, that is, to the strongest party therein (Mill, 129).
Thus, though democratic government is indeed desirable, it also has effects that are not
immediately obvious. The tyranny of the majority can lead to a profound restriction of
personal freedom, especially where the majority is able to use government to impose its will.
Herein, then, lies a major flaw in utilitarian philosophy. That is, what if the greatest amount
of happiness is found in the oppression of the minority? According to Mill, such actions by
the majority group are not justifiable.
As previously stated, however, Mill’s main concern is not with the governmental
influence of the majority, but with the societal influence of the majority. Particularly, Mill
believes that the public will exercise the greatest amount of oppression not within the
confines of the law, but via “social tyranny”—tyranny of opinion and feeling. As he posits,
“There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual
independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism”
(Mill, 130). For Mill, then, societal justice and injustice lie, respectively, in the protection of
and restrictions on liberty. He further defines this restrictive function in very narrow terms:
“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection” (Mill, 135). As the term
“self-protection” would seem to indicate, Mill leaves room for justification only through the
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“harm principle.” Only where a member of society is harming others may he be justly
sanctioned either legally or socially. Beyond those boundaries, he may exercise perfect
freedom to harm himself in any way he chooses8.
Mill is not so naïve as to believe that there will be no social retribution for those who
act outside the bounds of “socially acceptable” behavior. Rather, he realizes that such
ostracism will take place, and he argues that it is justified so long as it is done
“spontaneously” and not for purposes of punishment. In fact, in a case where a man
intentionally stands outside conventionality,
We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except
those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may
suffer very severe penalties at the hand of others for faults which directly
concern only himself...A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, selfconceit—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences—must expect
to be lowered in the opinion of others (Mill, 208).
Going beyond this sort of “natural” criticism, however, to encroach upon the rights of an
individual or to cause him loss in any way is morally reprehensible (Mill, 209).
Just Punishment Based on “Harm”
Though Mill does not concern himself at length with the proper role of government in
punishment, he does attempt to delineate what he considers an acceptable “preventive form of
government.” As in other instances, Mill believes that the issue of appropriate penalty
requires devolution to the individual level (Mill, 228). Stated simply, he argues that the level
of punishment should increase as the severity and regularity of harm increases, with no
punishment being levied for harm committed against oneself. A “drunk”, for instance, should
receive no punishment for the harm he is doing to himself by continuing to drink. If his

8

On this point, Mill excludes children and “those of unsound mind,” as they are technically the wards of society
(or the state) and therefore under societal control (135).
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consumption of alcohol does not affect anyone else, he is perfectly free to maintain his
drunkenness. If he is to injure someone while intoxicated, however, he has transferred harm
to an innocent party, and his act therefore warrants punishment, which may include a
restriction on his drinking. Moreover, “if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable
to penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to
which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity” (Mill, 230).
Thus, for Mill, the differentiation between innocent drunkenness and harmful drunkenness is
important.
Five Circumstances of Injustice
While On Liberty is certainly one of Mill’s most famous works and otherwise
deserves an extensive recounting, no discussion of Mill’s views on justice would be complete
without an examination of chapter five of Utilitarianism. Titled, “On the Connection
between Justice and Utility,” the section begins by “throwing light” on the “distinguishing
character of justice, or of injustice” (Mill, 297). In all, Mill describes what he believes to be
the five most important circumstances of injustice, with the parallel distinctions representing
just actions.
First, Mill argues that each man has a unique set of legal rights. Whether it be his
property or his own personal liberty, every individual is endowed with certain possessions
belonging to him by law. As such, it is unjust for any man to violate the legal rights of
another man. Yet Mill’s second circumstance of injustice offers a reasonable exception to
this rule. In some cases, he argues, laws will necessarily be unjust and will therefore restrict
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the liberty of one or more individuals9. Since in these cases individuals cannot be said to
have a legal right to certain possessions (with liberty or freedom of action being counted
among possessions), it may still be said that their moral rights are being violated by an unjust
law (Mill, 299).
In the third instance, he states quite simply that an individual should reasonably
expect to receive a return in like proportion to his giving. That is, a person who “does right
deserves good.” Thus, a return of evil in exchange for good is tantamount to an unjust
exchange. Fourth, Mill posits that it is unjust for a person to “break faith” with another
person, meaning that a man has treated his fellow man unjustly if he breaks a contract, an
agreement, or “an engagement” knowingly. Finally, and perhaps most importantly10, Mill
locates a major source of injustice in the practice of partiality. Those who administer
punishment and rewards must be impartial in order for a just transaction to take place (Mill,
300). He succinctly defines this point stating, “Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of
justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is
supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting the solicitation of any
motives which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would dictate”
(Mill, 301).
In concluding this examination of Mill, then, it is perhaps crucial to note that, though
his is regarded as one of the greatest philosophical minds, Mill himself was never able to
reach a definitive definition of justice. In fact, his description lies almost wholly in the sphere

9

Mill argues that the only criterion for considering a law unjust is if it fulfills the same requirements of
trespassing against a law. That is, laws are unjust if rights or liberties are restricted.
10
Though it is impossible to argue that Mill intended this point to be given more weight than the previous four,
he gives much greater attention to this topic, discussing it for the better part of four pages, while giving only a
maximum of two paragraphs to the previous conditions.
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of the subjective, perhaps leaving us just where we began in determining what justice truly
means. Mill writes, “Justice implies something which is not only right to do, and wrong not
to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right” (305). Yet this
examination has been illuminating on other fronts, with a clear evolution in the liberal
conception taking shape in the writings of these three men. Having charted this change,
discussion and analysis, including an examination of the liberal notion through the lens of
three-strikes legislation, is now merited.
Three-Strikes, Locke, and the “Safety of the Innocent”
As the previous assessment has already revealed, any analysis of John Locke’s theory
as it pertains to three-strikes legislation necessitates a two-pronged approach. Presenting it in
two distinct settings allows Locke to define justice both as it should be and as it must be.
That is, the justice of the state of nature is unadulterated by entitlement and edict; it is justice
based solely on natural law and natural order. The justice of the social contract, on the other
hand, is tainted by unequal distribution and the broad hand of the law—both imperfect in
their measurement of justice, yet necessary for a functional society and legitimate
government. To fully understand the picture of justice that Locke intends to paint, then, an
exploration of each in its own setting is crucial.
The concept of justice in Locke’s state of nature appears both brutal and unforgiving.
Property in one’s labor and in one’s life is not only seen as sacred, but as the sole end for
man’s existence. Protection of that property, consequently, proves highly subject to the
whims of man’s passions and his fears of physical and moral subjugation. Thievery, assault,
encroachment, and most certainly murder are all seen as cowardly attempts by one man to rob
another of his sole possessions in life and are therefore punishable by death. How else, other
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than “lenient,” could a policy of increased punishment with escalated offenses be viewed in
such a state? According to Locke, those who steal, kill, and cheat others out of their
belongings and their very lives place themselves in a state of war with their victims. Whether
they are violent offenders or petty thieves, left to their own devices in the state of nature,
these criminals represent a significant threat to the continued survival of those around them.
Harsh punishment is not only necessary, but is also just in the purest sense.
Focusing solely on retribution, punishment, and prevention, Locke’s state of nature
leaves little room for rehabilitation. Rather, the protection of society11 is preferred to the
security of individuals who have already proven aggressive. As Forde writes, the Second
Treatise of Civil Government,
shows eloquently and at length how the social good is most effectively
advanced by self-interested action, in the acquisition of property, the defense
of individual rights, and the like. In making this argument, the Second
Treatise takes the perspective of society rather than the individual citizen
almost exclusively (2001: 400).
Thus, from Locke’s perspective, a policy of giving an offender an additional chance (let alone
three) to make good on his trespasses within the state of nature12 is not only reckless, but also
an injustice to the individual he victimized and to society. It would therefore not be unwise to
conclude that, within the state of nature, Locke would indeed view a policy of “three-strikesand-you’re-out” as unjust, but not due to its lack of focus on rehabilitation. Rather, a policy
such as three-strikes prevents crime from being properly redressed and therefore invites
chaos.
11

In these sense, the term “society” does not refer to the state of man in a post-social contract world. Rather, it
refers to the collective state of humanity as it is organized before the rise of government. Thus, it does not refer
to mankind as a cohesive, law-abiding unit.
12
This point necessarily suffers from a flaw in logic since no such “policy” could ever be mandated in the
absence of law. Rather, it would be up to the individual to decide how he should deal with his transgressor. It
is, however, important to note that any such leniency would necessarily “bleed-over” into the rest of society.
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Still, proponents of a theory which charges that class-based inequities exist in the use
of three-strikes sentencing might argue that a central tenet of Locke’s theory is being violated
in today’s society, and as such, society has placed itself in a state of war with the exact same
individuals it seeks to punish. The “enough and as good left for others” clause of Locke’s
doctrine holds that individuals should not excessively appropriate goods such that there is not
“enough and as good left for others” to acquire (Locke, 32). For those who believe that threestrikes targets poor, male minorities, it seems only logical to conclude that society, with its
narrow focus on private goods, conspicuous consumption, and unlimited accumulation has
placed itself at odds with thieves and violent criminals who act out in both desperation and
frustration.
In some sense, this argument seems plausible when one considers that a majority of
the prisoners sentenced under the law are of low socioeconomic status and can scarcely afford
private legal representation (Kovandzic, et al, 2004: 238). Yet this analysis suffers from
several fatal flaws. The first, of course, is that the over-accumulation of property by
collective individuals (society) can in no way be construed to be the sole responsibility of one
individual, whether or not he or she is viewed as representing the whole. Thus, the robbery of
a convenience store is in no way a legitimate redress of the “enough and as good” grievance,
as neither the cashier nor the owner (not to mention any bystanders) have placed themselves
in a state of war with the perpetrator. Second, Locke himself might be critical as to the
reasons why such individuals are not in possession of “enough or as good.” Is overaccumulation truly the problem, or as Locke might suspect, can the criminal’s lack of
property be attributed to a deficiency in “industriousness” and “rationality” (Locke, 32)?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is vital that the true intention of Locke’s words be
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examined. Did he intend this clause as an unending restriction on accumulation, or did he
believe that such a condition would eventually fade away? According to philosopher Jeremy
Waldron, the latter seems more plausible. He postulates,
The ‘enough and as good’ clause is not intended by Locke as a restriction on
acquisition and so does not have to be removed in the course of Locke’s
justification of contemporary inequality. Locke argues, in the first part of
chapter 5, that “in the first Ages of the World” the natural limitations on
property ensured that there was, after every appropriation, enough and as good
left for others to appropriate. But, he argues, once men found legitimate ways
of getting around these limitations, the situation changed drastically and there
was no longer enough and as good left for others. Since that consequence
flowed naturally, however, from acts of men that were not in themselves (after
the invention of money) violations of natural law, it simply has to be accepted.
It is not the removal of a restriction or the overthrow of a necessary
condition—it is just the way things (now) are (1979: 324).
Following this line of reasoning, then, there need not be “enough and as good” left in society
for the authority of law to hold weight. While this had previously been a condition of the
state of nature, it naturally evolved and vanished without perverting the tenets of natural law.
Any claim of just cause based on this principle is therefore seen as illegitimate.
While it is not clear whether Locke foresaw the impossibility of sustaining the
“enough and as good” principle even within the state of nature, it is clear that he believed that
the state of war was no longer justifiable once men entered into the social contract. This
compact among men gave both rise and authority to government and was predicated on the
necessary condition that men would no longer have the power to remedy their own personal
grievances. Those who have broken the social contract are to be dealt with through the legal
mechanisms of government, an institution charged solely with promoting the good of society
as a whole. As criminologist Bill Lawson argues, “In general, executive prerogatives can be
justified by their tendency to promote a benefit or prevent a harm that would not have been
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promoted or prevented had the power of government been limited to the strict letter of the
law” (1990: 17). Thus, Locke fully realized that ensuring the good of the whole might entail
the restriction of individual liberties in some cases, yet such actions were justifiable if
necessary to satisfying the end of government. Moreover, Locke emphatically stated that
“when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred” (28).
Consequently, it seems that such a philosophy would rule Locke’s view of three-strikes
legislation. If the good of the whole of society is being preserved and the safety of the
innocent protected, there is no reason to believe that such a law is unsound or unjust.
Three-Strikes in the Utilitarian Framework
While it is not difficult to estimate Locke’s probable view on three-strikes legislation,
Jeremy Bentham’s take on the law would likely prove much more complex. Though at its
heart Bentham’s theory emphasizes the importance of maximizing utility, it also contains
subtle nuances which might call into question the legitimacy of the three-strikes formulation.
Thus, while one could conceivably argue that three strikes should be examined with a view
toward community happiness, it is also important to explore whether or not the law falls in
line with Bentham’s views on punishment.
When analyzed at its most basic level, Bentham’s theory does indeed have much to do
with the maximization of community happiness. In fact, he expressly states that man is
happiest when the sum of the interests of the whole of man is optimized. Moreover, he
argues that what is both right and just in law depends upon what will bring happiness to the
greatest number of individuals. As Rodman writes, “Ultimately, in Bentham’s view,
benevolence directed toward the community at large is produced or strengthened mainly by a
government which acts in a wise, efficient, benevolent fashion” (1968: 203). Thus, from the
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standpoint of utility, three-strikes legislation is just insofar as it tends toward the protection
and happiness of the greatest number of individuals. While it may involve a certain level of
dissatisfaction and even pain on the part of those subjected to punishment under the law, if
the preponderance of individuals find it necessary to their protection, then it is not unjust.
Still, Bentham was not content to allow the boundaries of legal punishment to go
unchecked. In fact, as shown above, he devotes a vast amount of attention to defining the
proper realm and reach of punishment. Taking this fact into consideration, it seems prudent
to conclude that Bentham would be wary of a blanket rule like the one required in threestrikes legislation. Since he advocated punishments that duly considered the act itself, its
circumstances, and its intentions, Bentham might be troubled with three-strikes’ tendency to
deal with varying degrees of crime with an identical level of punishment. On this point
Rodman argues, “For Bentham, the criminal act creates an unjust situation which has to be
rectified by the imposition of a punishment roughly equivalent to the pain or suffering caused
by the offense” (1968: 197). Thus, without consideration of motive or intent in third-strike
sentencing, the two most important factors in deciding punishment, it is difficult to argue that
Bentham would be entirely comfortable with such a measure.
Classes of offenses are also important to Bentham’s explanation of the need for
varying degrees of punishment. Crimes against individuals, against society, against oneself,
or against one’s neighborhood, therefore, naturally require different levels of punishment, as
different levels of dissatisfaction are imposed on transgressors in each case. Philosopher
Michael Clarke thus argues that “the moral gradation of punishment” was important for
Bentham because it was the only mechanism of ensuring that “a sentence accomplishes the
aim of punishment” (1971: 134). The “aim of punishment” under three-strikes laws may
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also be called into question, as punishment that is seen to be ineffectual in preventing future
crime is considered unjust and unnecessary. Thus, if experts are correct in assuming that
three-strikes legislation has produced no deterrent effect, its existence as a form of
punishment is not easily justified (Kovandzic, et Al, 2004: 234-235).
It seems, then, that Bentham’s view of three-strikes legislation is simply not reducible
to a line in the sand. Rather, judging the law from the standpoint of his theories on both
utility and punishment requires in-depth analysis of the ways in which he defined each. In
the end, it seems fair to say that Bentham would not completely dismiss the law as an unjust
travesty, but would also not embrace such a policy due to its inability to accomplish the aims
of punishment.
In the words of economist Jacob Viner, “That Bentham frequently fell into language
which pictured human behavior as if it consisted almost solely of action based on calculations
of personal gain and that his imagination was deficient with respect to the possible range of
human emotions is beyond dispute” (1949: 374). For his part, John Stuart Mill attempts to
avoid such a mistake. Realizing that individuals do not always act, as Bentham believed, for
the sole purpose of experiencing pleasure, Mill is willing to recognize a more flawed version
of human behavior.
Three-Strikes and the Priority of Liberty
For Mill, punishment is only justifiable insofar as it tends toward the improvement of
the offending individual. As he argues, “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by
the end” (Mill, 136). Following this line of thought, it seems that the punishment involved in
third-strike sentencing cannot be thought to accomplish the goal of improving the individual.
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Rather, the goal is the protection of society and restraint of the offender. This, of course, is
not to say that all individuals are conducive to improvement. It is nearly inevitable that some
portion of the criminal population, particularly that segment which tends toward violence,
will not be open to alterations in behavior. In cases involving theft or drug use, however,
where individuals would seemingly be of little threat to society were they to undergo such an
improvement, using Mill’s explanation, it would not be justifiable to level any sort of
punishment that did not seek to accomplish this end.
As previously discussed, Mill’s main concern in defining a “tyranny of the majority”
is not the possible corruption arising from political or legal authority. Instead, Mill believes
that social sanctions are far more common and of more importance. He argues in On Liberty,
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still
vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public
authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the
tyrant—society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it—its
means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the
hands of its political functionaries (Mill 130).
Mill’s point in this regard is well taken. Social pressure can be one of the greatest forces of
injustice, tacitly punishing those who do not succumb to the social will. Yet, as this
statement implies, Mill recognized that, in some cases, the social aspect of the “tyranny of the
majority” can become entangled with the political aspect. What is then the outcome of such
an instance? Could fear of crime and hatred toward repeat offenders in society, “bleed-over”
into our legal system and produce policies like three-strikes? The answer to such a question
is certainly not within the scope of this study, though the import of asking such questions
remains. That is to say, if three-strikes has, in any way, accomplished this sort of legal
restriction of socially feared minorities, Mill would doubtlessly consider such a law unjust
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and unacceptable. Philosopher Daniel Jacobson agrees writing, “Were enough people
attracted to a deadly form of pleasure, society would be imperiled and could claim selfprotection as justification for admittedly unjust legislation. But this would be anathema to
Mill” (2000: 288).
Some still might argue that Mill would approve of the law in some instances based on
his belief that different circumstances produced crimes with varying degrees of severity. On
this point, there is much to be debated. In essence, however, such an argument does bear
considerable weight. Mill’s aforementioned example of drunkenness, for instance, clearly
indicates a willingness on his part to increase the severity of punishment for repeat offenders.
When paralleling this vignette with three-strikes cases, however, two clarifications are
necessary. First, Mill in no way advocates punishment for the sole purpose of punishment in
his example of the drunkard. Thus, one might infer that in this instance as in others, Mill
intends that the increased sentence of the drunken offender will still tend toward his
improvement rather than simple restraint. Second, it is important to note that if Mill were to
find some merit in using three-strikes, he would likely be unhappy with the inclusion of
individuals such as drug users who may not have violated anyone’s rights according to the
harm principle. Consequently, if an argument could be made for Mill’s acceptance of such a
policy, it would be necessary to note that Mill would advocate that the types and degrees of
severity of crimes be taken into account such that those perceived “wrongs” that did not
violate the harm principle could not be subject to legal interference.
While Bentham holds steadfastly to the utilitarian principles of pleasure and pain, Mill
is not convinced that utility should triumph in all situations. He recognizes that what would
bring the greatest amount of happiness to the most individuals might not always coincide with
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what is just, and in such cases, he argues that justice should take precedence. Mill concludes,
“It appears from what has been said, that justice is a name for certain moral requirements,
which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefore of
more paramount obligation than any others” (320). Thus, as the previous indicates, Mill
would not be willing to sacrifice personal liberty on the basis of utility. As Jacobson argues,
“Yet, despite this renunciation of natural rights and his commitment to some form of
utilitarianism, Mill frequently appeals to both legal and moral rights” (2000: 291). The
three-strikes law, from Mill’s point of view, then, cannot be defended based on simple utility
in cases where it proves detrimental to liberty.
At the close of this chapter, it is clear that the liberal notion of justice underwent an
intense evolution in a relatively short period of time. Moving from a view of three-strikes as
too lenient to a theory that would renounce three-strikes’ inability to promote progress, the
liberal conception witnessed a complete transformation in just under one-hundred years time.
While these classic writings are indeed important in understanding the path that liberalism
has taken over time, it is also crucial that three-strikes be examined from the standpoint of
modern liberal theory. Subsequently, the final chapter will examine John Rawls’ A Theory
of Justice, in order to further explore the liberal notion of justice in its contemporary setting.
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Chapter Three: Justice in Rawlsian Perspective
John Rawls is perhaps the most famous liberal philosopher of the twentieth century,
and his eminent work A Theory of Justice remains one of the mostly passionately debated
theories of its time, more than thirty years after its initial publication. Rawls’ theory is both
profound and enlightening, with its optimistically cautious view of human nature representing
yet another benchmark in liberalism’s evolutionary scale. While Rawls’ work does deal
primarily with the liberal notion of justice, some readers may still be puzzled by its inclusion
in a discussion of just punishment. Though A Theory of Justice focuses most heavily on
social and economic liberty, it also proves well-suited to a discussion such as this one for a
variety of reasons.
First, and most importantly, Rawls’ conception of an “original position” lends itself to
a variety of discussions concerning the just or unjust nature of laws and institutions. The full
scope of this reasoning will be undertaken later. For now, however, it will suffice to say that
the “original position” not only presents the perfect context for considering how economic
and social life should be ordered, but also allows for a just conception of punishment. UCLA
law professor Sharon Dolovich agrees as she argues,
Rawls’ framework is promising for our purposes [discussing legitimate
punishment in liberal democracy] precisely because it demands that we
consider with some measure of dispassion even the interests of potential
criminal offenders. That we might be inclined to resist applying this
framework because it demands this limited measure of emotional detachment
only goes to show how necessary it is to impose such dispassion, artificially if
necessary, if we are to hope to end up with principles that all members of
society may freely affirm as just and fair (2004: 317).
Thus, Rawls’ theory is not merely “suitable” for such a discussion, but instead represents a
vital component in any examination of liberalism and justice.

49

Yet there is a second reason for including Rawls in a discussion such as this one. At
the end of Chapter Two, liberal theory had evolved to include a modified version of
Benthamite utilitarianism. By Rawls’ own admission, his work represents liberalism’s final
departure from the utilitarian conception, moving instead toward what can only be described
as “welfare state liberalism.” He argues, “My aim is to work out a theory of justice that
represents an alternative to utilitarian thought generally and so to all of these different
versions of it” (Rawls, 20). Moreover, in Rawls’ view, not only does utility sometimes prove
directly contradictory to justice, but any statement directly linking the two proves to be a non
sequitur. He posits,
Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others (Rawls, 3).
As such, it is easy to see how Rawls’ conception brings this discussion of the liberal notion of
just punishment full circle. In sharpest contrast to our starting place with Locke who believed
that government need only protect the property rights of the innocent, Rawls argues that
government is responsible for ensuring that all citizens are treated justly, no matter if they are
innocent or guilty, good or evil. These factors, combined with the fact that A Theory of
Justice was written in the context of contemporary society, shall serve to show why Rawls
should have the final say on the just or unjust nature of three-strikes legislation.
The Original Position
As with the previous thinkers, establishing the Rawlsian view of three-strikes first
necessitates an exploration of Rawls’ theory, the cornerstone of which is his conception of an
“original position.” Resembling what has otherwise been described as the state of nature, the
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original position is Rawls’ recounting of the initial situation and serves much the same
purpose as the state of nature in theories like Locke’s. Additionally, much as Locke
envisioned the social contract as arising from the state of nature, Rawls likewise conceives of
a contract of sorts which he loosely refers to as the “first principles of justice,” or more
precisely, as “justice as fairness” (102). In general, the original position is just as its name
implies—a place where man exists before government and law have been established, a place
of perfect equality. Moreover, “The original position is defined in such a way that it is a
status quo in which any agreements reached are fair. It is a state of affairs in which the
parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by
arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces” (Rawls, 104).
Many of Rawls’ assumptions about the conditions of the initial situation mirror those
described by Locke in his Second Treatise of Civil Government. Actors, for example, are
presumed to be self-interested, but they are also viewed as generally good-natured and
lacking in malicious intent. Rationality is also assumed, as actors realize that it will be
impossible to order the world to every individual’s satisfaction. Thus, cooperation will be
viewed as mutually beneficial and therefore necessary to self-preservation. Moreover, within
the context of the original position, as in the state of nature, all actors are equal vis-à-vis other
actors, making it impossible for one actor to have leverage over the others (Rawls, 117-118).
Yet, there is one aspect of Rawls’ theory that stands in sharp contrast with classical
descriptions of the state of nature generally and with Locke’s description specifically. That
is, while Locke focuses on justice from the point of view of individuals, with individual rights
and property being taken into account, Rawls removes any possibility of taking such things
into account. By placing the actors in the original position behind a “veil of ignorance,”
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Rawls prevents them from formulating justice based on individual perception. Those
occupying this station, consequently, have no knowledge of their particular social or
economic class, their specific talents, skills, intelligence, or abilities, the type of society in
which they will live, or even the generation to which they will belong. Rather, they may
know only “the general facts about human society.” More precisely, “They understand
political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social
organization and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know
whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice” (Rawls, 119).
Constraints of the Concept of Right
Even after applying the veil of ignorance, Rawls finds that there are several “formal
constraints of the concept of right” (Rawls 112). In other words, within the original position
there are certain rules which the parties must agree to in choosing the first principles of a just
society. His first contention is that all chosen principles must be general in nature. This is
necessary because actors behind the veil of ignorance do not have the capacity to make
specific formulations. Thus, even assuming a person could attempt to mold the principles to
his own personal advantage, he would be unable to, as he does not know any specifics of his
situation. Second, the principles chosen in the situation must be universally applicable or
must “hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons” (Rawls 114). Third, the
principles must be publicly acceptable and publicly known. Fourth, “a conception of right
must impose an ordering on conflicting claims” (Rawls 115). That is, claims which are more
just than others must be taken first. Last, the total set of principles is to be the “final court of
appeal” in deciding standards. As such, neither society nor law is seen as an acceptable
competitor (Rawls 116).
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While Rawls’ theory has often been criticized because of the utopian nature of its
foundations1, Rawls himself recognizes that the original position is a wholly theoretical and
therefore unattainable construct. As he acknowledges, “So while the conception of the
original position is part of the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that there are actual
situations that resemble it. What is necessary is that the principles that would be accepted
play the requisite part in our moral reasoning and conduct” (Rawls, 104).
Basic Principles of Justice
Since the original position actually represents a vehicle for choosing just principles, it
is important to understand which principles Rawls believes we would select in such a state.
In general, he believes that, given all other alternatives, there are two basic principles of
justice that would prevail in the context of the original position. In Rawls’ description,
First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all (53).
The delineation of these principles into two separate realms proves rather important to Rawls’
theory as a whole. The first principle deals with the “priority of liberty,” or what he considers
to be the primacy of political liberty, liberty of conscience, and “freedom of the person.” In
the second instance, Rawls is concerned mainly with what he calls “distributive justice” or
justice in the distribution of wealth and income. It is from this second principle that the
preponderance of A Theory of Justice flows, but this is mostly due to the fact that the second
principle informs many of the outcomes of the first principle. That is, much of how we come
1

“State of nature” theories, oddly enough, do not often suffer the same criticism, though the basic foundations
of such constructs are also entirely theoretical. In my view, Rawls’ theory has been subject to such scrutiny
partially because of its restriction on knowledge, but also due to its focus on the just ordering of society before
the just ordering of individuals—concepts which are reversely ordered in most classical liberal theory.
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to define political liberty has to do with how we view economic arrangements. Moreover, the
second principle also proves important because of principles that arise subsequent to its
acceptance.
To understand the exchange between the second principle and succeeding principles,
it is first crucial to become familiar with Rawls’ conception of natural conditions.
Specifically, he argues that no condition of moral desert exists within society. People do not
come to have more than others because of an overarching hierarchy that logically favors those
with better parentage, skill, or virtue. Instead, “The natural distribution is neither just nor
unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These
are simply natural facts” (Rawls, 87). Such conditions do become unjust, however, when
they are left unchecked by social and political institutions, such that those who are the worst
situated remain so even as the better situated make gains in wealth or status. Consequently,
Rawls calls for a “principle of redress” to correct these conditions. He writes,
This is the principle that underserved inequalities call for redress; and since
inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities
are to be somehow compensated for. Thus the principle holds that in order to
treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society
must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born
into the less favorable social positions (Rawls, 86).
Overall, however, this principle of redress satisfies the conditions of a much larger
conception arising from the second rule. Referred to as the “difference principle,” this rule
holds that inequalities are acceptable insofar as they benefit the least advantaged or when
attempting to correct for such a disparity would cause an even greater inequality (Rawls, 72).
Thus, it becomes clear that, in Rawls’ view, a well-ordered society is one that would not only
allow for the advancement of all classes of people, but would require such a condition, even
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where creating such a situation would cause some amount of inequality in the upper classes.
Such inequality is not seen as unjust, however. On the contrary, inequalities favoring the
least advantaged are seen as leveling mechanisms correcting natural inequalities that are
neither inherently just nor unjust (Rawls, 73).
Still, some may look upon such an arrangement with skepticism, charging that Rawls’
conception requires an unattainable level of societal altruism. However, Rawls argues that
this is not the case. Rather, actors in the original position need not be altruistic to recognize
that, not yet knowing their own station in life, they will be best served by creating a society in
which everyone will be equally likely to thrive and succeed. To this end, Rawls assumes that
the actors in the original position would be presented with a list of alternative principles of
justice. Among them are the earlier incarnations of the liberal conception of justice discussed
in the previous chapter. Choosing among alternatives that include the “general conception,”
or the notion that everyone is permitted to advance their own interests as they so please, and
the various concepts of utility, Rawls argues that rational, self-interested individuals would
always select the two basic principles delineated above, as they can be most reasonably
expected to be to the benefit of everyone, considering that no one knows who he or she will
be (107).
The Four Stage Sequence
While the original position remains the most crucial step in ensuring the selection of
just principles, it is important to understand that it is but one stage in the execution of a
complete system of just arrangements. Hence, once the principles of justice have been
discerned within the original position by actors cloaked in a veil of ignorance, Rawls
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imagines that individuals begin moving through a four stage sequence in which the veil
becomes progressively less restrictive.
At the start of the first stage in the sequence, actors become somewhat aware of how
their particular society is ordered, but they remain ignorant to their own personal stations in
life. This condition is important because the actors are moving from the initial situation into
a constitutional convention and thus are able to make informed decisions about a specific
society without personal agendas tainting the process. During this time, the actors “are to
decide upon the justice of political forms and choose a constitution; they are delegates, so to
speak, to such a convention. Subject to the constraints of the principles of justice already
chosen, they are to design a system for the constitutional powers of government and the basic
rights of citizens” (Rawls, 172). Then, after having chosen the most appropriate constitution,
the delegates enter the second stage in the sequence, becoming legislators who introduce bills
and pass laws based upon the just principles developed in the original position. Here, Rawls
is careful to note that the actors may need to “move back and forth between the stages of the
constitutional convention and the legislature” in order to provide for the most just set of
conditions (173-174).
Having made attempts to frame the most just situation possible, the actors enter stage
three of the sequence. “A division of labor between stages” is created such that the parties
will be able to evaluate the political and procedural processes as a whole to ensure that they
are just. At the completion of this stage, full knowledge becomes available to all participants.
Finally, the fourth stage entails “the application of rules to particular cases by judges and
administrators, and the following of rules by citizens generally” (Rawls, 175).
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Institutions and the Rule of Law
While participating in the four stage sequence, actors concern themselves with how to
best order justice among both individuals and institutions. Even so, Rawls makes clear that
the principles of justice applied to institutions are entirely separate from those which govern
individuals. As Rawls asserts,
By an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities and
the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as
forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on,
when violations occur (47-48).
Furthermore, “A person taking part in an institution knows what the rules demand of him and
of the others. He also knows that the others know this and that they know that he knows this,
and so on” (Rawls, 48). Thus, while Rawls describes justice among individuals as
“substantive justice,” he refers to the institutional form as “formal justice” (Rawls, 51). The
formal justice of institutions makes up what Rawls calls “the rule of law” and subsequently
governs the realm of just and unjust action.
Because Rawls is mostly concerned with social equality and societal justice, he
remains mostly silent on the subject of the rule of law. He does, however, choose to explicate
two important points. First, Rawls argues for a condition that he terms “justice as regularity,”
which holds that similar cases of transgression against society should be treated with similar
punishment in all cases. Moreover, “One kind of unjust action is the failure of judges and
others in authority to apply the appropriate rule or to interpret it correctly” (Rawls, 206-207).
The phrase “apply the appropriate rule” seems to imply that, much like Bentham, Rawls
believes that punishment should be decided based on individual circumstances. Also, the
condition that similar cases should be punished similarly necessarily negates the idea of a
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blanket rule for punishment. For example, then, it would be unjust for a petty thief to receive
the same punishment as a person convicted of grand larceny. Similarly, a person convicted of
grand larceny should not be incarcerated for the same length of time as a serial killer.
Second, Rawls admits that, even in a well-ordered, just society, there will still be
some persons who refuse to abide by the laws, no matter how just. Therefore,
while a coercive mechanism is necessary, it is obviously essential to define
precisely the tendency of its operations. Knowing what things it penalizes and
knowing that these are within their power to do or not to do, citizens can draw
upon their plans accordingly. One who complies with the announced rules
need never fear an infringement of his liberty (Rawls, 212).
Hence, institutions must meet these criteria in order to be considered just. Yet, as will be
discussed at length in the next section, these conditions require that citizens know the law and
have a reasonable expectation of what their punishment might be for committing a certain
offense. Thus, for now it will suffice to say that such conditions are not always easily met.
Three-Strikes and the Rawlsian Conception
Though analyzing twentieth century legislation from the varied perspectives of
classical authors like Locke, Bentham, and Mill presents its own set of unique challenges, in
some respects, considering three-strikes through the Rawlsian lens proves an even greater
task. Rawls doubtlessly went to great lengths to narrow the two basic principles that he
believed would be adopted in the original position; yet much of his theory remains abstract
and open to interpretation. Even so, when one leaves aside what Rawls neglects to tell the
reader, it seems not only plausible, but also sensible to focus on the principles he did
delineate. Those principles have helped drive liberalism’s evolution forward from its
birthplace in narrow individualism to its focus on balancing utility and liberty to its most
recent concentration on social, economic, and political equality. Philosopher David Lyons
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writes of this definitive shift away from utilitarian conceptions, “Rawls maintains that liberty
may not be restricted save to secure maximum liberty under concrete circumstances. And he
stresses that limitations on liberty and inequalities of freedom cannot be justified on the
ground that they promote the general interest” (1972: 536). Consequently, A Theory of
Justice proves to be a more than capable guide when it comes to discerning liberalism’s
modern view of the just or unjust nature of three-strikes.
Violation of the Assumption of Knowledge and Justice as Regularity
Perhaps one of the most potent arguments against three-strikes legislation is also
one that might be easily overlooked. Throughout the course of his work, Rawls continually
reiterates the idea that, in a perfectly ordered and just society, all citizens would know the
law. Interestingly, most proponents of three-strikes also claim that public knowledge of the
law produces a deterrent effect. These facts beg the question: To what extent is this aspect of
the Rawlsian conception of justice being fulfilled?
As shown in Table 1 (see Chapter One), twenty-five separate states have enacted
three-strikes legislation, with each of those states adopting its own unique statute. Even
educated legal minds might find memorizing the subtle nuances of these state laws a dizzying
task, especially when one considers the marked variation in factors like felony eligibility
(violent versus non-violent), the nature of the triggering conviction, the mandatory sentence,
and parole options. For example, a person convicted of three felony drug possession offenses
in Connecticut would receive a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. In
Colorado, however, the same person could commit the same three offenses, but would not be
eligible for sentencing under the law. Moreover, this same offender could receive parole for
violent crimes in Colorado, but would not be granted the same leniency in Connecticut on
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less severe possession charges. Further complicating this issue are “wobbler” cases that blur
the line between felony and misdemeanor charges. In this instance, it would be necessary for
the thief to know the monetary limits of what he could steal and would require the drug user
or dealer to know what quantity of a substance he or she could possess without being charged
with a felony.
Thus, it seems less than reasonable to assume that average citizens would have the
specialized knowledge necessary to make the law just according to the Rawlsian model. This
is not, of course, to say that an offender’s ability to distinguish a right action from a wrong
one is tied up in his or her knowledge of the mechanics of the legal system. Rather, the
injustice of these laws lies not in the attempt to punish, but in the overly complicated, nonuniform way in which punishment is administered. As such, at the very least, the law violates
the “justice as regularity” condition of Rawls’ theory.
Violation of the Second Principle
Rawls gives more attention to his second principle of justice (of which the difference
principle2 is a part) than any other aspect of his work. Continually advocating a system that
would ensure that the least advantaged would not have to suffer the ill-effects of an unequal
society, Rawls insists that such a condition is essential to a just society. Though some readers
might be tempted to compare this principle to Locke’s “enough and as good left for others”
requirement (which becomes unnecessary outside of the state of nature), the two concepts
differ in one very important way. Specifically, Locke’s argument holds that all men would be
perfectly equal in possessions within the state of nature so long as each man labors equally as
hard as his neighbor. Rawls does not make such an assumption. Rather, he realizes that
2

As previously stated, the difference principle requires that social and economic arrangements benefit everyone,
or in such cases where inequalities do exist, they do so only to the benefit of the least advantaged.
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inequalities are inherent to human society and are therefore neither just nor unjust. However,
while these inequalities are not unjust in and of themselves, they become unjust once society
allows them to continue unchecked. Accordingly, a just society recognizes these inequities
and ensures that inequality only exists insofar as it benefits those who are least well situated.
What, then, does this mean for the least advantaged of American society? Since the
preponderance of prisoners sentenced under the three-strikes rule are members of the most
economically disadvantaged group in the United States (minorities3), it would seem to
suggest that an injustice created in the violation of the difference principle is being matched
with increased punishment for an already disadvantaged group—a second violation of this
principle. As Sharon Dolovich explains, “Punishment imposed where it would have no (or no
further) deterrent effect would place the offender in a worse-off position than she would
otherwise occupy all other things being equal. It would thus be merely gratuitous, serving no
legitimate purpose” (2004: 401). Since studies seem to suggest that three-strikes laws are not
producing the desired deterrent effect4, they cannot be considered just as they often place the
least advantaged in a worse position. Accordingly, punishment for the purpose of
retribution, according to Rawls, serves no just purpose and would be disallowed in a truly just
society.
Three-Strikes and the Original Position
Though it seems reasonable to assume that Rawls would strongly disagree with threestrikes sentencing based on the legislation’s multiple violations of basic principles, the most

3

According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the median household income for blacks and Hispanics was $8000 and
$10,000 less than for whites, respectively. Moreover, the same statistics show that only 4% of whites live in
poverty compared with over 8% of blacks and Hispanics. (This data, along with charts comparing the 1990 and
2000 Census reports are available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/tablist.html)
4
Refer to Chapter One.
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important question has yet to be asked. Would the persons occupying the original position,
having been cloaked in a veil of ignorance, choose a system of increased penalty for multiple
offenders? Would the delegates to a constitutional convention or the members of the most
just of legislatures choose to enact a law like three-strikes? If we are to believe Rawls and
assume that the parties placed in the original position would adopt his two basic principles,
the answer to both of these questions can be none other than a resounding “no.”
On this point, there are several factors which must be considered. First, some readers
may object that, in the original position, parties are to assume total compliance with the laws
of a well-ordered society, and as such, a just system of punishment would not be discussed in
the original position as it would appear to be unnecessary. Yet this criticism seems of less
import when one considers Rawls’ explanation of knowledge in the original position. He
tells us that the parties have knowledge of the workings of human society and of the concept
of justice itself. This being the case, it seems not only reasonable, but also most logical to
assume that, if the parties possess the ability to conceptualize justice, they must also possess
knowledge of what constitutes injustice. As a result, would they not be forced to develop
some fair mechanism for punishing unjust actions? Dolovich agrees and argues that those
persons placed in the original position would, in considering the ordering of human society,
have to recognize a condition of partial compliance, as total compliance eliminates the need
for just action. Recognizing this as an unchanging condition, the actors would make a fair
assessment of punishment based on the two basic principles already adopted (Dolovich, 2004:
400).
A second objection might be raised with regard to violations of the social contract.
From this viewpoint, it may be charged that any violation of the social contract in the most
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just situation possible negates a person’s right to just treatment. Should not criminals who
have broken the social contract be punished to the fullest extent? Have they not been given
sufficient opportunity to become law-abiding citizens? The point of this argument is welltaken, but seemingly overstated.
First, Rawls saw “punishment as an extension of liberty springing from the first
principle,” meaning that a system of legal sanctions would need to be in place in the most
perfect of societies as a means of keeping order from breaking down. Still, these legal
sanctions, if ever used, need not be so severe as to infringe upon the liberties still afforded the
accused by the remainder of the first principle (Brubaker, 1988: 829). That is, the first
principle would seemingly afford a criminal the right to “basic liberties compatible with a
similar scheme of liberties for others” who have also committed crimes. In short, this means
that prisoners are entitled to fair, non-retributive punishment that is administered in
proportion to the offense. Severe penalties cannot justly be imposed for the simple purpose
of reprisal.
Second, it is important to remember that the actors in the original position make
decisions based on self-interest. Thus, knowing what they know of human society and of
justice, but having no understanding of who they may become individually, it seems likely
that they would want to develop the most fair system of punishment possible, as they may
become criminals themselves. It follows, then, that the rational, self-interested actor would
not want a blanket rule like three-strikes to govern punishment.
Within the context of the original position, in absence of personal, moral, and social
biases, moreover, the actors are afforded the unique opportunity to truly discern how
individual crimes should be punished. Considering that these actors would still be bound by
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the first and second principles, it seems unlikely that they would adopt a system which
disproportionately punishes the least advantaged and make no effort to “punish similar cases
similarly.”
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Conclusion
In concluding this examination of three-strikes and the liberal conception of justice,
we should evaluate what has been brought to light throughout the course of the discussion.
To begin, let us consider the issue of three-strikes from a factual standpoint. Though much of
what makes the legislation a controversial issue remains open for debate, a few
generalizations can be made. First, it has been shown that young, male minorities are far
more likely to be sentenced under the rule than their white counterparts. Second, the content
of the law varies significantly from state to state, making comprehension of each version’s
specific guidelines a nearly impossible task for the average citizen. Third, while many have
understandably charged that the law is a vehicle for the promotion of underlying prejudices,
in truth, we may never know the true intentions of the legislation in the states in which it is
passed. What is clear, however, is that the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that threestrikes has not proven itself to be an effective crime deterrent.
Using three-strikes as a lens for observation, a distinct evolution in the liberal notion
of justice has been charted. In the case of John Locke, the issue was examined from two very
different perspectives. First, it was shown that, in the context of Locke’s state of nature, the
idea of “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” proves exceedingly lenient and would therefore not be
acceptable according to Locke’s formulation. Once men leave the state of nature and enter
into the social contract, however, it becomes necessary to re-examine the issue in a second
setting. On this point, it has been shown that Locke would not object to the restriction of the
rights of criminals, so long as the “safety of the innocent” is preserved. Furthermore, if the
law is meeting the end of government—the protection of property—then there is no reason to
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consider it unjust. In Locke’s own words, “The great end of men’s entering into society” is
“the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety” (Locke, 55).
Jeremy Bentham’s conception of just punishment is more complicated. While it was
found that Bentham advocates the maximization of community happiness, it was also shown
that he has an interest in defining punishment in very specific terms. Among those
definitions is one that regards “punishment for the sake of punishment” as useless. He writes,
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to
augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place
to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract from that
happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief. But all punishment is
mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it
ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises
to exclude some greater evil (Bentham, 120).
Moreover, Bentham is not satisfied with a blanket rule governing punishment.
Rather, punishment must be considered based on the motive (the intended effects of the
action) and disposition (the sum of intentions) of the individual. Closely coinciding with
these factors are the classes of crimes arising from illegal actions, which Bentham ranks
according to the level of malice present in the person’s motive and disposition.
In sum, then, Bentham believes that punishment should accomplish the goal of
preventing future criminal action, and as such, if a given sanction does not produce a
deterrent effect, it cannot be considered just. Consequently, it has been shown that Bentham
would not disapprove of the law insofar as it promotes the general happiness of society, but
he would also not advocate such an action given that it does not consider crimes in their
specific settings and produces no ascertainable deterrent effect.
Our examination of John Stuart Mill helped move the discussion beyond utility to the
realm of the protection of liberty. Though Mill certainly believed in maximizing community
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happiness, he was not willing to do so at the expense of personal liberty. Punishment, he
argues, should not be a restraint mechanism, but should instead tend toward the improvement
of the offending individual. Interestingly, Mill overtly discusses what may and may not
qualify as an offense and concludes that the government has no standing to punish an
individual for acts which cause no harm to outside parties. Mill explains, “People must be
allowed in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves” (231).
Furthermore, if three-strikes is accomplishing a tacit restriction of socially feared minorities,
then the law can be seen as none other than a legally sanctioned tyranny of the majority. For
justice to truly be served, Mill argues that a tyranny of the majority should not be allowed to
fester in the social arena:
Protection against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs
protection also against the tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling; against
the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them (130).
John Rawls advocates a complete rejection of utilitarian conceptions of justice.
Instead, he argues that the concept of justice cannot be fairly explored within the confines of
our own unique selves. Consequently, we must debate the tenets of justice in the context of
the original position behind a veil of ignorance in order to ensure complete objectivity. Using
this framework, a few important findings were realized. First, the “assumption of
knowledge” aspect of Rawls’ theory, which holds that all members of society know the laws
and have a reasonable expectation of their punishment for breaking those laws, is not being
met with respect to current three-strikes sentencing. Second, the variation in the law from
state to state represents a blatant violation of the “justice as regularity” principle, as similar
cases are not being tried or sentenced similarly under three-strikes. Third, the possibility that
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three-strikes violates the conditions of the second principle by placing an already
disadvantaged minority in a more dire position has been explored and seems plausible given
the proportion of minorities sentenced under the rule. The combination of these factors,
finally, led to the conclusion that a law such as three-strikes would not be adopted in the
original position, as it is illogical from the standpoint of self-interest.
Clearly, then, the preceding discussion merits two important conclusion. First, the
answer to the question, “Is three-strikes just according to the liberal notion?” varies greatly
based on which version of liberalism you choose to explore. While early liberal theorists
might have considered the law just, it is clear that liberalism’s current formulation advocates
an unequivocal rejection of such legislation. Second, throughout the course of this
examination, it has become exceedingly clear that the concept of just punishment has evolved
in concert with the idea of liberty. As such, the more a theorist focuses on personal liberty,
the less willing he becomes to accept the idea of harsh punishment. On this point, more
discussion is needed.
The pattern of change in the liberal notion of justice has proceeded along a
remarkably linear path toward the point at which we have currently arrived. Yet, it is not
only the concept of justice that has changed, but also the concept of liberty. Beginning with
Locke, liberty was defined as the right of men to freely order their own actions so long as
they did not interfere with the life, liberty, or property of others. By the time of Bentham’s
writings, however, liberty was defined in terms of utility or community happiness. Thus, the
liberty of man came to include the rational maximization of pleasure. Bentham’s protégé,
John Stuart Mill, sought to reverse this trend and not only argued for the priority of liberty
over utility, but also expanded the definition of liberty to include social responsibility.
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Rawls, finally, brought the evolution full circle by denying the importance of utility and
instead advocating a concept of justice which views liberty as inherently necessary to justice.
Furthermore, whereas Locke argued for the protection of liberty through limited government,
Rawls argues that expanded governmental and social responsibility is the only viable
safeguard to personal liberty.
Though this discussion has surely not determined the meaning of “justice” in the
largest sense (if indeed that task can be accomplished), it has managed to define both what
justice is and is not in the context of a changing liberal conception. Moreover, it has shone a
spotlight on the possibility that the laws governing mankind may never fully intersect with
the principles governing justice. On this point, it is perhaps best to reflect on the immortal
words of John Stuart Mill. He writes, “Among the diversities of opinion, it seems to be
universally admitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law, consequently, is not the
ultimate criterion of justice, but may give to one person a benefit or impose on another an
evil, which justice condemns” (Mill, 299). It seems that he could not have been more correct.
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